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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND GUY MURPHY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. * 
Case No. 14356 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and order entered 
by the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, Judge of the Third 
District Court, dismissing with prejudice petitioner-
appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as a 
matter of law on November 2, 1975. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case came on regularly for hearing before 
the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, Judge of the Third 
Judicial District Court, on September 25, 1975. After 
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hearing, Judge Snow issued an Order denying with pre-
judice petitioner-appellant1s Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus as a matter of law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower 
courtfs judgment and order dismissing appellantfs 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as a matter of 
law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Raymond Guy Murphy was charged by 
Information before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, 
District Judge, Third Judicial Court, with the crime 
of "Murder in the First Degree" in violation of then 
existing provisions of the Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
After a jury trial a verdict of guilty was 
returned against defendant-appellant, and he was 
sentenced to a term of life imprisonment on January 
29, 1971. 
Petitioner-appellant filed a motion for new 
trial on January 25, 1971, on grounds of jury mis-
conduct and erroneous jury instructions. He sub-
sequently appealed his conviction to the Utah Supreme 
Court on grounds other than jury misconduct, and that 
conviction was affirmed on February 4, 1972. 
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Subsequently petitioner-appellant filed a 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in April, 1975/ 
alleging deprivation of a fair trial through jury 
misconduct. On September 25, 1975, the instant action 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus was heard before the Hon-
orable Marcellus K. Snow, Judge of the Third 
Judicial District Court, on defendant-respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss on several alternative grounds. 
After said hearing, Judge Snow issued an Order 
granting respondent's Motion to Dismiss with Pre-
judice the Petition as a matter of law. No hearing 
on the merits of said petition was had. From that 
judgment and order of dismissal, appellant brought 
a direct appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED APPELLANT'S 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SINCE HABEAS CORPUS 
IS NOT A PROPER REMEDY IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
Two sub-points support the dismissal of 
appellant's position. 
A. PETITIONER'S ALLEGATIONS FAILS TO STATE 
A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. 
A writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary 
writ to be used in limited situations. Rule 65(b) (i) 
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( 
of the Utah Code Ann. (1973 Amendment) provides: 
"Habeas corpus - Appropriate 
relief by habeas corpus proceedings 
shall be granted whenever it appears 
to the proper court that any person 
is unjustly imprisoned or otherwise 
restrained of his liberty. If the 
person seeking relief is imprisoned 
in the penitentiary and asserts that 
the proceedings which resulted in 
his conviction there was a substantial 
denial of his rights under the Con- ~ 
stitution of the United States or under 
( the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, or both, then the person seeking 
such relief shall proceed in accordance 
with Rule 65B(i)." (Emphasis added). 
Generally, relief will not lie except where 
"there exists no jurisdiction or authority, or where 
the requirements of the law have been so ignored or 
distorted that the party is substantially and effectively 
denied what is included in the term due process of 
law, or where some other such circumstance exists that 
it would be wholly unconscionable not to re-examine 
the conviction." Bryant v. Turnerf 19 Utah 2d 284 at 
287, 431 P*2d 121 (1968). 
Petitioner does not allege any injury falling 
within the criteria enumerated above. No facts are 
presented on which to base a finding that: 
1. The law was so ignored or distorted as to 
deny petitioner's rights to due process. 
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2. There is some other circumstance that would 
make it unconscionable for the court not to re-
examine petitioner's conviction. 
The action of the jury members was a discussion 
of the sentence of the petitioner and did not go to 
the issue of his innocence or guilt. 
In State v. Moore, 183 P.2d 973, 111 Utah 458 
(1947), an almost identical form of misconduct existed 
as alleged by petitioner. There the court upheld a 
rape conviction despite affidavits of four jurors 
which stated that the jurors were persuaded to vote for 
conviction by another juror's statement that the 
defendant would have to serve only a few months in 
jail if found guilty with a recommendation of leniency, 
which jurors make in returning a verdict of conviction. 
Nevertheless, such affidavits did not establish 
defendant's right to a new trial for misconduct of 
jury preventing a fair and impartial trial. 
"The affidavits show no coercion, 
nor tactics which might have stripped 
any juror of his ability to act in 
accordance with his honest convictions." 
Moore, supra, at 978. 
Thus, petitioner in the instant case similarly 
fails to state a claim of action upon which relief can 
be granted. 
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The court in State v. Athorn, 46 N.J. 247, 
216 A.2d 369 (1966), very ably discusses the issue 
before this court. It says: 
"If verdicts could be easily set 
aside as a result of an investigation 
into secret jury deliberation, dis-
appointed litigants would be encouraged 
to tamper with jurors, to harrass them 
and to employ fraudulent practices in 
an effort to induce them to repudiate 
their decisions. Moreover, an 
open invitation would be extended to 
any disgruntled juror who might 
choose to destroy a verdict to 
which he had previously assented. 
The secrecy surrounding jury 
deliberations is necessary not only 
to prevent the unsettleing of verdicts 
after they have been recorded, but 
also as an aid to the deliberative 
process itself. Each juror should 
be encouraged to state his thoughts 
freely, good or bad, so that they 
may be weighed by the other jurors." 
(Emphasis added). 
Therefore, only in the most compelling cir-
cumstances, involving the substantial rights of the 
defendant, should a juror be allowed to impeach his 
own verdict. 
Chief Justice Crockett announced in Brown v. 
Turner, 21 Utah 2d 964, 440 P.2d 968 at 970 (1968): 
"When a person has been duly 
convicted of a crime it is not the 
purpose of the law nor the proper 
function of the courts, to be 
hypercritical in scrutinizing pro-
ceedings in an effort to discover 
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some basis for relieving him from the 
penalty the law demands and the 
possibility of rehabilitation because 
of some technical defect or irregularity 
which had no actual adverse effect 
upon his rights or the outcome of the 
proceedings." 
Without a showing that there was a substantial 
denial of due process, or that an unconscionable result 
would occur, habeas corpus relief does not lie. Respondents 
have established that such jury conversations as alleged 
by petitioner simply do not meet these requirements. 
B. PETITIONER HAS MADE NO SHOWING OF PREJUDICE 
RESULTING FROM THE ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF THE JURY. 
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure . 
states Utah's rule of harmless error. Judgments are not 
reversible unless it can be shown that prejudice has 
resulted from the alleged error, and that there has 
been a substantial denial of due process. Odgen 
Commission Co. v. Campbell, 66 Utah 563# 244 Pac. 
1029. Judgment cannot be reversed on harmless error. 
No evidence has been offered that indicates that 
acceptable trial proceedings were violated. Juror 
Dennyfs statement does not establish the blatant jury 
misconduct required before prejudice or due process 
denial result. Petitioner therefore has not met his 
burden. As this court held in Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 
-7-
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2d 964, 440 P.2d 468 (1968): 
"If the established rules of 
procedure are followed they assure 
ample protection of the rights of 
one who is accused of crime. After 
this is done and a judgment has 
been rendered all presumptions 
favor validity and the burden of 
showing to the contrary is upon 
one who attempts to upset it." 
Brown at 99. 
The discussion of the jurors which is the 
basis for petitioner's allegations had no bearing 
on the issue of guilt or innocence. If the jurors 
did not believe petitioner was guilty of first degree 
murder, they could have found him guilty of a lesser 
included offense, which would have made possible a 
shorter prison sentence. Therefore, no denial of 
petitioner's rights ensued. The harmless error rule 
should apply. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANT'S 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PRIOR TO A HEARING 
ON THE MERITS. 
When relief prayed for under a Writ of Habeas 
Corpus cannot be granted as a matter of law, the court 
need not hold a full evidentiary hearing. Even if, 
arguendo, petitioner's allegations are true, dismissal 
of his petition was inevitable for reasons set out in 
Point I} namely, that those jury activities did not 
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deny petitioner a fair trial and do not at law con-
stitute jury misconduct. Nevertheless, the District 
Court did allow petitioner to testify in his own be-
half before issuing its ruling. 
Respondent acknowledges that certain types 
of blatant jury misconduct, i.e. bribery, threats, 
verdict by lot, undoubtedly deny a defendant a fair 
trial. In those circumstances a new trial shall be 
granted. The jury deliberations petitioner complains 
of do not meet the statutory requirements of misconduct, 
whose parameters have been determined by case law. 
See Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 964, 440 P.2d 468 
(1968), State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973 
(1947), Gee v. Smith, 541 P.2d 6 (1975). Therefore, 
the District Court properly refused to hold a full 
hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court made no error in dismissing 
with prejudice appellant's Petition for a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus prior to a full hearing. This court 
should affirm that judgment and order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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